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Former Planning and Codes Director Lee Lawson’s civil case against the City of Tullahoma and former City Administrator Jennifer Moody was recently thrown out after nearly two years.

A story titled “Lawson out as planning and codes director,” that was run in The News back in 2020, as stated in the lawsuit “on June 18, a reporter for the Tullahoma News (a local newspaper) filed an “open records request” for Plaintiff’s “personnel file.” HR Director [Casta] Brice received the emailed request and, after conferring with Moody and redacting confidential information, provided the file to the reporter,” was used by Lawson as part of his defense against the city and Moody.

The documents provided to The News by Brice stated he “failed to demonstrate a good faith effort to take direction from the City Administrator and to take steps necessary to ensure that the planning and codes department operates in a manner consistent with those directions.”

Lawson’s 2021 complaint cited the information provided to The News by Brice “discredited [his] reputation for truthfulness,” and added Moody and the then Board of Mayor and Aldermen violated his constitutional rights to due process.

United States Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee noted her need for more proof of a violation of constitutional due process, stating “as far as the Court can tell, Plaintiff does not contend Defendants failed to comply with the procedures in the personnel regulations. Moreover, it is not clear whether Plaintiff contends the personnel regulations themselves created a property right to continued employment. Plaintiff does contend the ‘pre-termination hearing was not sufficient to provide the procedural due process that [he] was owed’ [Doc. 77 at Page ID # 1694], but this argument depends on whether Plaintiff was entitled to the procedure and standards set forth in § 8(c) (2) of the city charter. Plaintiff also contends that ‘[i]n some instances of employment, a disciplinary process itself can establish a property right to the public employment.’ [Id. at Page ID # 1683 (citing Williams v. City of Franklin, No. 3:08-cv-0164, 2009 WL 1033179 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 16, 2009)]. However, the personnel regulations in effect when Plaintiff was hired state that they are ‘not an employment contract,’” and that the “City reserves the right to change any and all such policies, practices, and procedures in whole or in part at any time, with or without notice to employees.”

Other points brought forth by Lawson included the argument that he was appointed by the board, to which it was revealed that he was hired by Louis Baltz and then approved by the board back in 2015.

“Plaintiff argues the BOMA ‘did not delegate the complete appointment power to the city administrator,’ but rather ‘reserved the power to complete the appointment power to itself.’ [Doc. 77 at Page ID # 1688 (emphasis added)]. Plaintiff’s argument is belied by the language of the personnel regulations—adopted by the BOMA—which clearly contemplate the City Administrator appoints Department Heads and the BOMA confirms the appointment. Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, when the ordinances, personnel regulations, and city charter are considered together, it is apparent the City Administrator possessed the authority to appoint Department Heads” stated Lee in the judgment.

Lee provided these details as “reasons, the Court finds, as a matter of law, that neither the Tullahoma City Charter nor the personnel regulations7 vested in Plaintiff a property right to future employment. Moody has demonstrated there are no material facts in dispute and Plaintiff has failed to show otherwise. As a result, Moody did not violate Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights when she terminated him from employment pursuant to the personnel procedures, and Moody is entitled to summary judgment on Count I of Plaintiff’s second amended complaint.”

The judgment was passed by Lee in the favor of Moody and the City, stating “For the reasons herein, Jennifer Moody’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. 62] and the City of Tullahoma’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. 68] are granted. Plaintiff’s claims are hereby dismissed in their entirety.”